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ABSTRACT: Have investment treaty arbitrators responded to the so-called ‘legitimacy 
crisis’ that has beleaguered the international investment regime in the past decade? 
There are strong rational choice and discursive-based reasons for thinking that 
arbitrators would be responsive to the prevailing ‘stakeholder mood.’ However, a 
competing set of legalistic and attitudinal factors may prevent arbitrators from bending 
towards the arc of enhanced sociological legitimation. This article draws upon a newly 
created investment treaty arbitration database to analyze the extent and causes of a shift 
in treaty-based arbitration outcomes. The evidence suggests that arbitrators are 
conditionally reflexive: sensitive to both negative and positive signals from states, 
especially vocal, influential and developed states.  
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1 Introduction 
The development of the modern investment treaty regime represents one of the most 
remarkable extensions of international law in the post-war period. Largely built on a network 
of more than 3500 signed bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional free trade agreements 
(FTAs), 1  and a handful of plurilateral investment treaties, 2  foreign investors are granted 
beneficiary rights primarily aimed at the protection of their investments. While each 
international investment agreement (IIA) is a stand-alone agreement with considerable 
diversity, agreements typically include similar standards of protection, 3  including most 
importantly, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. Combined, it has been 
claimed that ‘no other category of private individuals’ is ‘given such expansive rights in 
international law as are private actors investing across borders.’4  
For a number of reasons, the development of this regime has precipitated a backlash from 
some states, various civil society actors, 5  and scholars. 6  Commonly referred to as a 
‘legitimacy crisis,’7 even some prominent insiders and expected supporters in the media have  
expressed disquiet. 8  Primarily, this phenomenon is not about the expansiveness of the 
substantive rights granted to foreign investors under IIAs, but rather the combination of such 
rights with the robustness of the ISDS mechanisms embedded within them. The result has 
been an explosion of litigation. With over 796 known investment treaty arbitrations initiated 
to date (almost all coming in the last 15 years),9 as well as a significant number of instances in 
                                                   
1 UNCTAD provides an extensive database on IIAs <http://investmentpolicy hub.unctad.org/IIA> accessed 5 
September 2016. 
2 See eg Energy Charter Treaty, North American Free Trade Agreement, Association of South-East Asian 
Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA), as well as, recently concluded or late-round negotiated treaties: Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement  and the Regional Comprehensive Partnership Agreement . 
3 IIAs typically include: prohibitions against expropriation without adequate compensation, full protection and 
security, fair and equitable treatment (FET), most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, and national treatment. 
4  B. Simmons, ‘Bargaining over BITS, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of 
International Investment’ 66 World Politics (2014) 12, 42. 
5 See eg P. Eberhardt and C. Olivet, ‘Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators, and Financiers are 
Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom’ Corporate Europe Observatory (November 2012). 
6 M. Langford, D. Behn, and O.K. Fauchald, ‘Tempest in a Teacup? The International Investment Regime and 
State Backlash’ in T. Gammeltoft-Hansen and T. Aalberts (eds) The Changing Practices of International Law: 
Sovereignty, Law and Politics in a Globalising World (forthcoming 2017). 
7  For an overview, see D. Behn, ‘Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art’ 46(2) Georgetown Journal of International Law (2015) 363.  
8 See eg Z. Douglas, ‘The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation off the Rails’ 2 Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement (2011) 97; G. Kahale, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?’ 7 TDM (2012) 
<www.transnational-dispute-management.com> accessed 5 September 2016; ‘The arbitration game: 
governments are souring on treaties to protect foreign investors’ Economist (11 October 2014). 
9 PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD) through 1 August 2016. 
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which the threat of treaty arbitration has been used as a bargaining tool, states hosting foreign 
investors are increasingly finding themselves having to defend their laws and policies before 
and in the shadow of international arbitral tribunals. Many of the concerns about the regime 
are tied specifically to outcomes of this litigation: they include claims that investment treaty 
arbitration is pro-investor, or anti-developing state; that the jurisprudence is incoherent, 
riddled with contested interpretations; and that the levels of monetary compensation are too 
high.10 
While critical perspectives grab the headlines, the regime also has its supporters. Some claim 
that individual arbitral decisions are not as expansive or pro-investor as imagined;11 that 
arbitral tribunals provide a relatively predictable legal framework;12 that investment treaty 
arbitrators are not insensitive to other branches of international law;13 and that investment 
treaty arbitration assists in depoliticizing international disputes by providing a significant 
alternative to the pre-war era of gunboat diplomacy.14 Thus, any efforts to ‘re-statify’ (or re-
balance) international investment dispute resolution should be resisted.15 
Between these critics and supporters, one finds an alternative evolutionary position: that the 
legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration is merely a ‘crise de croissance’ – ‘growing 
pains,’16 and as the system matures, it will evolve and adapt into a more legitimate, consistent, 
and effective form of international adjudication. A central part of this expected evolution will 
come from the arbitrators themselves. Indeed, certain empirical theories suggest that 
adjudicators are responsive to material and symbolic signals from other actors.17 However, the 
existing empirical literature on the legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration has 
focused primarily on proving the existence or non-existence of bias18 with only a nascent 
                                                   
10  See, e.g., G. Van Harten, ‘Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2012) 211, 251; M. Langford, ‘Cosmopolitan 
Competition: The Case of International Investment’ in C. Bailliet and K. Aas (eds) Cosmpolitanism Justice and 
its Discontents (2011). 
11D. Collier, ‘Book Review: Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s 
Promise by D. Schneiderman’ 68 Cambridge Law Journal (2009) 231. 
12 O.K. Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis’ 19 European Journal of 
International Law (2008) 301.  
13 J. Fry, ‘International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of International Law’s Unity’ 18 
Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law (2007) 77. 
14 D. Behn, ‘The Worst Option but for All the Others? The Performance of Investment Treaty Arbitration in 
Historical Context’ in T. Squatrito et al (eds) The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals (2016 
forthcoming). 
15 C. Brower and S. Blanchard, ‘From “Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting from Injustice:” The Case against “Re-
Statification” of Investment Dispute Settlement’ 55(1) Harvard International Law Journal Online (2014) 45.  
16 A. Bjorklund, ‘Report of the Rapporteur Second Columbia International Investment Conference: What’s Next 
in International Investment Law and Policy?’ in J. Alvarez et al (eds) The Evolving International Investment 
Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (2011) 219. 
17 See Section 3 below.  
18  Van Harten (n 10); S. Franck, ‘Conflating Politics and Development: Examining Investment Treaty 
Outcomes’ 55 Virginia Journal of International Law (2014) 1; T. Schultz and C. Dupont, ‘Investment 
Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study’ 25 
European Journal of International Law (2014) 1147. 
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doctrinal literature examining whether arbitrators might be leading a shift in response to the 
legitimacy crisis.19  
This backdrop provides an opportunity to explore how adjudicators respond to systemic 
critiques and how such responses might be measured. In this article, we ask whether there is 
(or has been) a reflexive and evolutionary self-correction by arbitrators. Do arbitrators seek to 
build both the normative and sociological legitimacy of the regime by adopting more state-
friendly approaches to the resolution of substantive and procedural questions? Or do we find 
that the behavior of arbitrators is largely unresponsive to the storm outside? 
We begin by mapping the trajectory of the legitimacy crisis and shift(s) in stakeholder mood 
(Section 2) and then theorizes as to how, why, and when investment treaty arbitrators might 
be sensitive to the legitimacy crisis (Section 3). After briefly examining the doctrinal 
literature, we use our PITAD dataset to examine whether there has been an aggregate shift in 
the outcomes of investment treaty arbitrations and whether the shifts can be explained by 
arbitrator behavior (Section 4).  
2  Charting the Legitimacy Crisis 
In order to understand the potential reaction of arbitrators to the legitimacy crisis in 
investment treaty arbitration, we need to chart its trajectory. We are particularly interested 
with what sort of ‘signals’ from this crisis might be communicated to arbitrators, who 
communicates these signals, and when. As the primary principals in the international 
investment treaty regime, states may be particularly influential in affecting arbitrator 
behavior, whether intentionally or otherwise, through particular signals.20 This would include: 
exit actions such as the denouncement of the ICSID Convention21 and the termination of IIAs; 
voice actions such as the adoption of more sovereignty-sensitive model IIAs; or mixed actions 
such as moratoriums on the signing of new IIAs, demands for renegotiations of IIAs, or 
increasingly aggressive litigation tactics in defending arbitration claims.  
Other stakeholders may also signal displeasure with the regime. Civil society actors might 
submit amicus curiae briefs and publicly mobilize against particular arbitrations or new treaty 
negotiations; academics may criticize awards or issue collective statements; and national court 
judges may decline to enforce awards at the domestic level. An additional type of signal that 
appears to have fueled the legitimacy crisis discourse are the controversies stirred by ‘public 
interest cases;’ cases where the claims made by foreign investors are pitted against measures 
taken by the respondent state that are alleged to be in the broader public interest.  
A Pre-Crisis (1990-2001) and Building Crisis (2002-2004) 
Initially, investment treaty arbitration was an obscure and largely unknown specialization that 
attracted little attention. Early cases were lumped together with the practice of international 
                                                   
19 D. Schneidermann, ‘Legitimacy and Reflexity in International Investment Arbitration: A New Self-Restraint’ 
2 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2011) 471. 
20 Langford, Behn, and Fauchald (n 6). 
21 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention), 18 March 1965, 5 ILM 532. 
 
 
 
5 
 
commercial arbitration. Building on some of the perceived problems already existing in 
relation to the protection of foreign investments, the modern international treaty regime began 
primarily in the post-war period as a response to decolonization through the signing of BITs 
between capital-exporting states and capital-importing states. The first modern BIT was 
signed in 1959,22 but it was not until 1968 that the first BIT providing for ISDS was signed.23 
The ICSID Convention was signed in 1965 and while the first ICSID arbitration was filed in 
1972,24 the first treaty-based arbitration was submitted in 1987 and decided in 1990.25 There 
was thus a 20-year gap between the signing of the first BIT with ISDS and the first treaty-
based arbitration.  
Throughout the 1990s there were just a few investment treaty arbitrations resolved; and it was 
not until the early part of the 2000s that the first controversial investment treaty arbitrations 
occurred. These were raised under NAFTA against developed states, the most prominent 
being the Loewen case. Although dismissed on jurisdiction, this case revealed that the justice 
system of the United States (US) had embarrassing shortcomings that might be remedied 
under international law.26 Together with other NAFTA cases against the US, Canada, and 
Mexico, these early arbitrations also highlighted a perceived threat to sovereignty and the 
regulatory autonomy of states. Significantly, these cases catalyzed the production of a 
corrective interpretive note by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in 2001 (with a more 
minimalist approach to the FET standard)27 and a new US model BIT in 2004 (that was more 
deferential to state interests, particularly in regard to the expropriation standard). 28 
Beyond NAFTA, several other cases in the early 2000s raised significant and specific 
concerns regarding the relationship between IIA standards and environmental or human 
rights-based policy measures.29 This included the Aguas del Tunari case30 against Bolivia that 
resulted in the infamous ‘water wars of Cochabamba,’ which prompted a global civil society 
campaign against the arbitration and the first-ever submission of an amicus curiae brief in an 
investment treaty arbitration. It also saw some controversial examples of inconsistent case 
law, in particular exemplified by the SGS cases – two different tribunals arrived at 
                                                   
22 Pakistan-Germany BIT (1959). 
23 Indonesia-Netherlands BIT (1968). 
24 Holiday Inn and Others v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1, Settled.  
25 Asian Agricultural Products v Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (27 June 1990). 
26 Loewen Group and Raymond Loewen v United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (26 June 
2003). See also A. DePalma, ‘NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, But Go Too 
Far, Critics Say’ New York Times (11 March 2001). 
27 Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission (20 July 2001), see 
G. Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the Rule of Law’ in F. Bachand 
(ed) Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration (2011) 175, 181-185. 
28 See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, US Department of State (2004). 
29 See O.K. Fauchald, ‘International Investment Law and Environmental Protection’ in O.K. Fauchald and D. 
Hunter (eds) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Vol. 17 (2006) 3, 11-25. 
30 Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Settled.  
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contradictory interpretations of the umbrella clauses in the relevant IIAs,31 as well as the 
Lauder and CME cases – in which two awards were issued on essentially the same subject 
matter in which the tribunals came to different conclusions.32 
Overall, these initial periods are exemplified by a transition from obscurity to increased 
awareness, with the some signals, rumblings of discontent – with controversial cases, and an 
emerging critical scholarship and general commentary – indicating that the international 
investment regime had a number of shortcomings and if not properly managed could produce 
unjust and illegitimate results. Notably, the dissent included some pushback by the US, which 
not only represented the most powerful state in the system but also one of the regime’s most 
dominant norm-setters.33   
B  Legitimacy Crisis (2005-2010) 
In 2004 and 2005, the phrase ‘legitimacy crisis’ emerges in the academic scholarship for the 
first time and the crisis discourse extends clearly beyond its NAFTA origins. The awards 
rendered as a result of the Argentinian economic crisis of 2001 were particularly prominent 
(and numerous) and they produced a large amount of commentary.34 They continued to fuel 
the perception that investment treaty arbitration might favor foreign investors 
disproportionately and that IIAs illegitimately restrict a state’s regulatory autonomy in times 
of national emergency.  
Elsewhere, controversial cases drove the legitimacy crisis discourse and elicited direct 
responses by states. Examples include a large number of cases filed against Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador following the passage of various nationalization laws; and the Foresti 
case against South Africa.35 The result was not only expressions of displeasure but partial exit 
strategies. Bolivia (2007), Venezuela (2009), and Ecuador (2012) denounced the ICSID 
Convention as a response to being sued under various IIAs; Ecuador and Bolivia terminated 
many of its BITs; and South Africa placed a moratorium on the signing of new IIAs pending 
an extensive policy review.36 In turn, this sent signals to other stakeholders that the status quo 
might not sustainable.  
By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the legitimacy crisis discourse and the 
practice of investment treaty arbitration is reaching maturity. One prominent example of such 
literature is the publication of the first book with the word ‘backlash’ in the title.37 This period 
                                                   
31 SGS v Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Award (6 August 2003); SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Award (29 January 2004). 
32 Lauder v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (3 September 2001); CME v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Final Award (14 March 2003).  
33 See J. Alvarez, ‘The Return of the State’ 20 Minnesota Journal of International Law (2011) 223, 235. 
34 See eg J. Alvarez and K. Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors. A Glimpse into the Heart of 
the Investment Regime’ in K. Sauvant (ed) Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009 
(2009) 379. 
35 Piero Foresti and Others v South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Discontinued. 
36 Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and 
Industry (June 2009). 
37 M. Waibel et al (eds) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (2010). 
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is also marked by significant signals from academia, primarily exemplified by the Public 
Statement on the International Investment Regime.38 It states in part:  
[w]e have a shared concern for the harm done to the public welfare by the international 
investment regime, as currently structured, especially its hampering of the ability of 
governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of human development 
and environmental sustainability… There is a strong moral as well as policy case for 
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state 
arbitration, including by refusal to pay arbitration awards against them where an award 
for compensation has followed from a good faith measure that was introduced for a 
legitimate purpose. 
C  Diverging Discourses: Late Crisis and Counter-Crisis (2011-2016) 
The last six years have witnessed a divergence in the discourses. The narrative of crisis 
became entrenched amongst a broader set of stakeholders, but the period also witnessed 
countervailing narratives and policy positions from many states.  
The period sees a dramatic increase in new publications mentioning the legitimacy crisis from 
2010 to 2011 onwards and produces globally prominent cases that further stoke the fires of 
controversy. Phillip Morris files cases against Australia39 and Uruguay,40 the energy utility 
Vattenfall files cases against Germany,41 and Chevron files an 18 billion US dollar (USD) 
denial of justice case against Ecuador.42 This in turn triggers new partial exit strategies. The 
tobacco packaging case brought against Australia led to the Gillard government announcing 
in 2011 that no future IIA with Australia would include ISDS provisions.43 Similarly, after 
being subject to a wave of cases, the Czech Republic initiated an internal policy review, 
mutually terminated some IIAs and renegotiated many others.44 
In 2014, the discourse on the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration moves into the public 
sphere for the first time45 and a number of high profile awards are rendered in 2014 and 2015 
against inter alia, Venezuela,46 Zimbabwe,47 Canada,48 and Russia.49 The number of new 
                                                   
38  31 August 2010 <http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28 
June%20201129.pdf> accessed 5 September 2016. 
39 Philip Morris Asia v Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Jurisdiction Award (27 December 2015). 
40 Philip Morris Brands v Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (8 July 2016). 
41 Vattenfall and Others v Germany (Vattenfall I), ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Settled; Vattenfall and Others v 
Germany (Vattenfall II), ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Pending. 
42 Chevron Corp and Texaco Petroleum Corp v Ecuador (Chevron II), PCA Case No. 2009-23, Pending. 
43 Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs and Prosperity, Australian 
Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (November 2011). 
44 K. Gordon and J. Pohl, ‘Investment Treaties over Time: Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing 
World’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment (2015). 
45 Partly as a result of TTIP. See eg Economist (n 10); ‘Trade agreement troubles,’ New Yorker (22 June 2015); 
‘TTIP will not be approved unless ISDS is dropped’ Financial Times (27 October 2014).  
46 See eg ConocoPhillips v Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits (3 
September 2013); Gold Reserve v Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award (22 September 2014); 
Venezuela Holdings v Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07, Award (9 October 2014). 
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cases being filed each year grows and stabilizes at an average of approximately 50, which 
includes more than 45 claims against European Union (EU) Member States in relation to 
subsidization schemes for the promotion of solar energy.50 Certain states continue to terminate 
and/or renegotiate their IIAs as a response to defending against treaty-based arbitration, 
including the Czech Republic, Romania, Indonesia, India, and most recently Poland.51   
However, the last three years also produce contradictory shifts in sovereign state policy 
towards the regime, reflecting a countervailing mood. The vast majority of states with IIA 
practices have chosen to leave their IIAs unaltered (even after being subject to disputes); and 
most prominently, between late 2011 and early 2013, negotiations on new regional mega-
agreements including ISDS provisions burst into life: the US and the other NAFTA states 
formally joined (and largely took over) the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) amongst 
almost all south and east Asian states was launched, and negotiations for the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and US were invigorated after the 
release of a high-level expert report on 11 February 2013.52 The EU emerged as an IIA 
negotiator with third states following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and is using 
this new competence to actively negotiate and sign new EU FTAs.53  
In the ensuing years, the European Commission has continued to negotiate and sign new 
FTAs (including with Brazil, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and 
Vietnam). China continued to renegotiate IIAs with stronger protections for foreign investors 
(as have Germany and the Netherlands) and also closes in on completing negotiations on BITs 
with the US and the EU. The Norwegian government (long absent in new investment treaty 
developments) released a new model BIT in 2015; Brazil started signing new IIAs (with 
Angola, Chile, Colombia, Malawi, Mexico, and Mozambique) after famously refusing to 
ratify any of their previously signed agreements from the 1990s;54 and Australia reversed their 
anti-ISDS policy and signed the TPP in February 2016.  
                                                                                                                                                              
47 Bernhard von Pezold and Others v Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Award (28 July 2015); Border 
Timbers v Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25 (28 July 2015). 
48 Bilcon of Delaware and Others v Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (17 
March 2015). 
49 The three landmark cases collectively granting 50 billion USD to Yukos shareholders: Yukos Universal v 
Russia, PCA Case No. AA 227, Award (18 July 2014); Hulley Enterprises v Russia, PCA Case No. AA 226, 
Award (18 July 2014); Veteran Petroleum v Russia, PCA Case No. AA 228, Award (18 July 2014). 
50  See D. Behn and O.K. Fauchald, ‘Governments under Cross-Fire: Renewable Energy and International 
Economic Tribunals’ 12(2) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law (2015) 117. 
51 See overview in Langford, Behn, and Fauchald (n 7); T. Jones, ‘Poland Threatens to Cancel BITs’ Global 
Arbitration Review (26 February 2016). 
52 Mention of the TTIP was included in the US President’s State of the Union address on the next day, and an 
announcement of new talks by the European Commission President came the day after that. 
53 The Lisbon Treaty conferred competence to the EU in the area of foreign direct investment for the first time: 
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01. 
54 P. Martini, ‘Brazil’s New Investment Treaties: Outside Looking … Out?’ Kluwer Arbitration Blog (15 June 
2015). 
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3 Theorizing Arbitrator Reflexivity 
We now turn from this depiction of legitimacy crisis to interrogate its effects and, specifically, 
whether it has impacted arbitrator behavior in investment treaty disputes. In other words, do 
arbitrators seek to manage, consciously or unconsciously, their sociological legitimacy?  
The techniques available for managing legitimacy are common to all international courts and 
arbitral bodies, 55 and perhaps even more so to investment treaty arbitration where a formal 
doctrine of precedent is absent. These techniques might include tightening jurisdictional 
criteria, exhibiting greater deference to respondent states on the merits, reducing the number 
of claims upon which a claimant-investor wins, reducing the amount of compensation 
awarded, shifting legal costs on to claimant-investors more frequently, or a combination of all 
of these. However, we need to establish theoretically why arbitrators would turn to such 
techniques. Below we set out two competing sets of hypotheses as to why and how this might 
be the case.  
A ‘Trustee’ Null Hypothesis: Status Quo 
Some scholars argue that adjudicators on international courts and arbitral bodies largely act as 
‘trustees,’ They adjudicate through delegated authority and according to their own 
professional judgments on behalf of states and other beneficiaries.56 This conception suggests 
that an external legitimacy crisis would exert little influence on adjudicative decision-making.  
Investment treaty arbitrators, particularly the president of an arbitral tribunal, would arguably 
fall into this category, ‘selected because of their personal reputation, and/or because the norms 
of decision-making in the Trustee’s profession are perceived as “good” by the wider public.’57 
Thus, we would expect that legal positivism would foreground arbitral decision-making as IIA 
provisions are applied in good faith to the specific facts of the case. Indeed, the fact that 
arbitrators regularly find for respondent states as much as claimant-investors may suggest a 
certain even-handedness.58 The public debate often centres on a few controversial cases which 
may be unrepresentative to the vast majority of investment treaty arbitrations.  
Accordingly, any change in arbitral behavior could only be explained by legal shifts in the 
regime’s substantive rules or a significant shift in the average set of factual circumstances. 
Yet, it is hard to say that there has been a change in either. For instance, while some recent 
and revised IIAs include general but vague clauses concerning the right to regulate or greater 
exceptions for domestic environmental and labor policies, it is not clear how relevant these 
                                                   
55 See eg M. Madsen, ‘The Legitimization Strategies of International Courts: The Case of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ in M. Bobek (ed) Selecting Europe’s Judges (2015); J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Journey to an Unknown 
Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political 
Integration’ 31(4) Journal of Common Market Studies (1993) 417; S. Dothan, ‘Why Granting States a Margin of 
Appreciation Supports the Formation of a Genuine European Consensus’ iCourts Working Paper Series No. 22 
(2015). 
56 See eg K. Alter, ’Agents or Trustees? International Courts in their Political Context’ 14(1) European Journal 
of International Relations (2008) 33. 
57 Ibid, 42. 
58 Behn (n 7); Franck (n 18). 
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changes are.59 A recent study suggests that renegotiations of IIAs actually tend to result in less 
room for state regulatory powers and more investor-protective ISDS provisions. 
Paradoxically, an attitudinalist perspective of adjudicative behavior would suggest the same 
static hypothesis. Here, adjudicators make decisions according to their sincere ideological 
attitudes and values60 (ie their personal – rather than professional – judgment) because they 
are relatively unconstrained by other actors, including states. 61  As investment treaty 
arbitrators represent a particular elitist and largely Western-based epistemic community, the 
commitment to promoting and protecting foreign investment may be particularly strong. 
Arbitrators from Western Europe and North America make up a total of 70% of all appointees 
to investment treaty arbitrations through 1 August 2016.62 Such differences can matter. In the 
context of the International Court of Justice, Posner and Figueredo report that permanent 
judges are more likely to vote for a disputing state that shares a similar level of economic 
development and democracy with their home state; with the pattern repeating, to a lesser 
extent, for shared religion and language.63 In the context of investment treaty arbitration, there 
has been a slight uptick in the appointment of arbitrators hailing from lesser developed states 
but many them tend to come from a similar ‘epistemic community’ and some suggest that 
aspiring arbitrators need to adhere to the ‘rules of the club’ in order to gain appointments.64 
Further, the risk that awards will be overridden at a later stage in the proceedings is relatively 
low. There are very limited grounds for appeal – either through annulment procedures 
(ICSID) or domestic court set-aside proceedings (non-ICSID); and it is difficult for states to 
amend treaty provisions to avoid any precedential effects that an award may have on future 
cases with a similarly-placed investors.65 Thus, arbitrators are relatively unconstrained in 
imposing their preferences even if they think strategically. Moreover, Lupu argues that 
international adjudicators are relatively insulated from the signals of states as they ‘serve 
publics with diverse and often conflicting preferences.’ 66  Thus, the expectation that 
investment treaty arbitrators will act reflexively overrates their ability to appreciate the 
existence, extent, and nature of any legitimacy crisis. 
                                                   
59 T. Broude et al, ‘Who Cares About Regulatory Space in BITs? A Comparative International Approach,’ in A. 
Roberts et al (eds) Comparative International Law (2016 forthcoming). See further discussion in Section 5B. 
60 See generally J. Segal and H. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (1993).  
61 J. Segal, ‘Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts’ 91 The American 
Political Science Review (1997) 1, 28. 
62 PITAD; see also ICSID Caseload: Statistics, Issue 2016-1 (January 2016) 18. 
63 E. Posner and M. de Figueiredo, ‘Is the International Court of Justice Biased?’ 34 Legal Studies (2005) 599. 
Together, these correlations explained a remarkable 60% to 70% of variance amongst individual judicial votes. 
64 Y. Dezalay and B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Transnational Legal Order (1998). 
65 Gordon and Pohl (n 44). 
66 Y. Lupu, ‘International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts’ 14(2) Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law (2013) 437, 438. Some scholars claim that the problem even extends to domestic courts. National judges 
will only have ‘vague notions,’ for example, about parliamentary preferences and the risk of legislative override. 
Segal (n 61) 31. 
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B ‘Agent’ Reflexivity Hypothesis: The Evolving Arbitrator 
The alternative to these static predictions is to suggest that investment treaty arbitrators do 
follow the mood shifts of states and other actors – as agents rather than trustees. A rational 
choice perspective holds that adjudicators: (1) may hold diverse preferences that extend 
beyond political ideology or good lawyering; (2) ‘take into account the preferences and likely 
actions of other relevant actors, including their colleagues, elected officials, and the public;’ 
and (3) operate in a ‘complex institutional environment’ that structures this interaction.67 
Evidence from various domestic jurisdictions suggests that judges are strategically sensitive to 
signals from the executive and legislature,68 although the scholarship is divided on the extent 
of this shift.69 As to public opinion, there is consensus that it has an indirect influence on 
judgments though judicial appointments but is divided over whether it exerts a direct 
influence on judges.70 At the international level, empirical and doctrinal scholarship suggests 
that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)71 and the WTO dispute settlement body72 are 
sensitive to the balance and composition of member state opinion within institutional 
constraints. 
Turning to investment treaty arbitrators, a strategic account would imply that a behavioral 
correction in response to legitimacy critiques could forestall certain material and reputational 
‘costs.’ First, arbitrators may be concerned collectively about such costs at the regime level. A 
failure to address legitimacy deficits may increase the risk of non-compliance by states, 
greater exits from the regime, and a substantial ‘pro-state’ re-orientation in future and/or 
revised IIAs. Such state behavior would inhibit the ability of arbitrators to impose their 
political preferences (comparable to the concern with ‘overrides’ in the judicial context)73 and 
maintain their general reputational standing. Second, investment treaty arbitrators may be 
                                                   
67 L. Epstein and J. Knight, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Preferences’ 16 Annual Review of Political Science (2013) 
11, 11. On diverse goals, see in particular L. Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial 
Behavior (2008). 
68 See eg J.C. Rodriguez-Rada, ‘Strategic Deference in the Colombian Constitutional Court, 1992-2006’ in G. 
Helmke and J. Rios-Figueroa (eds) Courts in Latin America (2011) 81-98; Epstein and Knight, ibid; D. 
Kapiszewski, ‘Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision Making on Politically Crucial Cases’ 45 Law and 
Society Review (2011) 471. 
69 Compare eg M. Bergara, B. Richman, and P. Spiller, ‘Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: 
The Congressional Constraint’ 28(2) Legislative Studies Quarterly (2003) 247 with Segal (n 71).  
70  R. Flemming and D. Wood, ‘The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to 
American Policy Moods’ 41 American Journal of Political Science (1997) 468, 480. See also B. Friedman, The 
Will of the People: How Public Opinion has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the 
Constitution (2009); L. Epstein and A. Martin, ‘Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes 
(But We're Not Sure Why)’ 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (2010) 263, 270; I. 
Unah et al, ‘U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Public Mood’ 30 Journal of Law and Politics (2015) 293. 
71 O. Larsson and D. Naurin, ‘Judicial Independence and Political Uncertainty: How the Risk of Override Affects 
the Court of Justice of the EU’ 70(2) International Organisation (2016) 377-408; M. Pollack, The Engines of 
European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU (2003). 
72 C. Creamer, ‘Between the Letter of the Law and the Demands of Politics: The Judicial Balancing of Trade 
Authority within the WTO’ Working Paper (2015). 
73 Larsson and Naurin (n 71). 
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concerned about their own individual reputation and material chances of future appointment.74 
If they experience reversal through annulment procedures,75 set-asides in domestic courts, or 
criticism by their colleagues or scholars, behavior may adjust. 
The notion that investment treaty arbitrators can be consequential in their decision-making 
has some empirical support. In a recent survey, 262 international arbitrators, which included a 
subset of 67 with experience in investment treaty arbitration,76 were asked whether they 
considered future re-appointment when deciding cases.77 A remarkable 42% agreed or were 
ambivalent. Given the sensitive nature of the question, it is arguable that this figure is 
understated.78  
These predictions may be enhanced by sociological forces, which are sometimes difficult to 
empirically disentangle from strategic behavior.79 The theory of discursive institutionalism 
proposes that discourse is not simply a static, internalistic, and slow-moving phenomenon but 
also an independent, dynamic, and liminal phenomenon. Shifts to stakeholder discourse may 
firstly shape the ‘background ideational abilities’ of judicial agents.80 Or as Cardozo put it, 
‘the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and 
pass the judges by.’81 Arbitrators may shift their background individual opinions as they 
become acquainted or engaged in the legitimacy debate. The crisis may also affect their 
‘foreground discursive abilities,’ which ‘enable them to communicate critically about those 
institutions, to change (or maintain) them.’82 Arbitrators may simply adapt to a different 
palette of legitimate reasons that can be foregrounded in their decision-making. Thus, changes 
in arbitrator behavior may not only be strategic. It may also be a process of rapid adjustment 
to a new social norm – ‘acculturation’ – that affects the strength of arbitrator preferences and 
their articulation. 
Taking into account the particular context of investment treaty arbitration, these 
institutionalist perspectives suggest a number of hypotheses, which can be divided into two 
categories: (1) general hypotheses and (2) specific hypotheses. 
 
 
                                                   
74 Studies of domestic judges that are subject to reappointment processes reveal higher levels of strategic 
behavior amongst this group. See I. Lifshitz and S.A. Lindquist, ‘The Judicial Behavior of State Supreme Court 
Judges’ APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper (2011). 
75  A. Van Aaken, ‘Control Mechanisms in International Investment Law’ in Z. Douglas et al (eds) The 
Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (2014) 409.  
76 S. Franck et al, ‘International Arbitration: Demographics, Precision and Justice’ ICCA Congress Series No. 18, 
Legitimacy: Myths, Realilities, Challenges (2015) 33. 
77 Ibid, 91. 
78 Ibid.  
79  On this empirical conundrum, see A. Gilles, ‘Reputational Concerns and the Emergence of Oil Sector 
Transparency as an International Norm’ 54 International Studies Quarterly (2010) 103. 
80 V Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’ 11 Annual Review of 
Political Science (2008) 303, 304. 
81 B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 168.  
82 Schmidt (n 80), 304. 
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General Hypotheses 
In light of domestic research, we might expect only states to exert any really influence on 
arbitrator behavior because it is only states that can impose material costs. As principals 
(treaty parties), states are essential for the institutional survival or development of the regime; 
and, as litigants (respondents); participate in the appointment of arbitrators;83 and decide on 
whether to comply with an adverse arbitral award. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1– State Signals: Arbitrators will respond strongly to the signals of states 
compared to other actors. 
Alternatively, we can hypothesize that investment treaty arbitrators would respond to the 
general stakeholder mood.84 The multiplicity of ‘micro-publics’ (investors, lawyers, arbitral 
institutions, academics, civil society, and national judges) can all affect regime reputation and 
discourse, and arbitrators may be conscious that these stakeholders can also affect state 
positions in the medium-to-long run. We therefore hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2 –Stakeholder Signals: Arbitrators will respond strongly to the general 
stakeholder mood.  
Specific Hypotheses 
However, these two broad general hypotheses or related measurements may be too imprecise 
to capture the specific patterns of adjudicative reflexivity. We can thus formulate a number of 
focused or specific hypotheses.  
First, we hypothesize that investment treaty arbitrators are particularly responsive to the views 
of certain audiences, namely large, powerful, or particularly influential states.85 Displaying 
such sensitivity may be strategic for reputational reasons and it possibly enhances the prospect 
of more arbitrations entering into the pipeline (particularly due to the large capital exports of 
these states’ investors). Moreover, the views of these states are more likely to be publicized in 
various communication channels.86 Thus we could state: 
Hypothesis 3 – Influential State Signals: Arbitrators will respond strongly to the 
signals of large, powerful, or particularly influential states. 
Second, investment treaty arbitrators may be only reflexive to certain types of cases. State 
deferentialism may be a safer strategy in cases that are more thematically controversial 
                                                   
83 In most cases, states solely appoint one of three arbitrators; and in many cases jointly appoint, along with the 
claimant-investor, the presiding arbitrator. 
84 Yates et al find that these judges are sensitive partly to shifts in changes in opinion in their home state, parties 
to which they are ideologically aligned, and a longer period of residence in the more liberal Washington DC. See 
‘“For the Times they Are A-Changin:” Explaining Voting Patterns of U.S. Supreme Court Justices through 
Identification of Micro-Publics’ 28 BYU Journal of Public Law (2013) 117.  
85  By large and powerful, we specifically include influential states actors in the system: the US, the EU 
(including its Member States), and China. We note that Larsson and Naurin (n 71) found that influential states 
had a greater influence on the CJEU, although they theorized that this occurred through greater voting weights in 
potential overrides of judgments in the Council of Ministers. 
86 However, the actions of small Latin American states in partially exiting the international investment regime 
have also been communicated widely.   
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because they court public or scholarly scrutiny that resonate with the underlying values of 
regulatory autonomy expressed in the legitimacy critiques. Many of these ‘public interest’ 
cases also raise questions of coherence with other branches of international law (eg 
international environmental and human rights law) in a way that shapes the surrounding 
discourse and the relevant institutional-legal environment. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4 – Public Interest Cases: Arbitrators will act more deferentially towards 
states in high-profile cases that court public or scholarly scrutiny. 
Third, greater arbitrator reflexivity may be shown to certain categories of respondent states 
that have experienced a stronger pattern of losing in investment treaty arbitration: ie certain 
lesser developed states. With Berge, we have demonstrated that claimant-investors are less 
likely to win the higher the respondent state’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
regardless of the level of a state’s democratic governance.87 Given this phenomenon, we 
might expect that over time investment treaty arbitrators would moderate asymmetries in 
outcomes between these different classifications of states. We thus hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 5 – Development Status Asymmetries: Arbitrators will narrow asymmetries 
in arbitral outcomes between more developed and lesser developed states  
Fourth, and unlike other international courts, investment treaty arbitrators are quite limited in 
their ability to communicate and act in a collective fashion. The polycentric and ad hoc nature 
of investment treaty arbitration  may prevent arbitrators from acting in a systemic manner, 
even if they wish to do so. Unlike a centralized court, an individual arbitral tribunal may feel 
it can make little contribution to signaling a systemic shift – it is merely one of many 
tribunals. The incentive to take extra inter partes action is thus minimal. 88  Moreover, 
arbitrators may be doctrinally constrained in considering general concerns. One line of 
investment treaty jurisprudence suggests that individual arbitrators should not systemically 
reflect and act as they are constituted as specialist not general adjudicative bodies.89  
However, it is not clear that this constraint applies equally to all investment treaty arbitrators. 
Repeat arbitrators (especially repeat tribunal presidents) are likely to be more sensitive to 
systemic threats and opportunities in comparison to one-shot arbitrators. They might 
constitute ‘the guardians of the regime,’ engaged in wider discussions over investment treaty 
law practice, development, and legitimacy. As tribunal presidents exert tremendous influence 
over the arbitral process, we propose a final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6 – Prominent Arbitrators: Repeat tribunal presidents will respond to 
signals from states and/or other stakeholders. 
                                                   
87 D. Behn, T. Berge, and M. Langford, ‘Poor States or Poor Governance: Explaining Outcomes in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’ SSRN Working Paper (2016) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2740 
516> accessed 5 September 2016.   
88 On this challenge at the domestic level in civil law courts, see K. Young and J. Lemaitre, ‘The Comparative 
Fortunes of the Right to Health: Two Tales of Justiciability in Colombia and South Africa’ 26 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal (2013) 179. 
89  M. Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates versus Systemic Implications: How Should Investment Tribunals 
Decide? The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture’ 29 Arbitration International (2013) 131.  
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4 Measuring Arbitrator Reflexivity  
How can we determine if investment treaty arbitrators adjust their behavior in response to the 
legitimacy crisis without asking arbitrators to disclose their approaches? The first approach is 
doctrinal. Recent jurisprudential scholarship in investment treaty arbitration suggests a 
potential reflex on a number of critical areas, whether it is cases involving an environmental 
component90 or how investment treaty arbitral tribunals analyze particular IIA standards such 
as  the criteria for a breach of the (indirect) expropriation standard,91 the FET standard,92 the 
FPS standard,93 MFN provisions,94 or the jurisdictional requirements relating to the definition 
of a ‘foreign investor.’95 While this research often points to an evolution of the jurisprudence 
– such as a move towards proportionality analysis in indirect expropriation cases96 (which 
recognizes more clearly a state’s regulatory autonomy) – the development is partial. Some 
arbitral tribunals criticize or ignore these doctrinal advances.97  
The advantage of such a doctrinal approach is that it provides a fine-grained perspective on 
the legal mechanics of change and permits a swift focus on those areas which have attracted 
the most criticism. It is also a field that can be developed, for example through longitudinal 
doctrinal studies of repeat arbitrator decisions on the same topic. However, the disadvantage 
of a doctrinal lens is that one may be tracking unwittingly a subterfuge of verbiage: arbitrators 
may simply craft and tweak their foregrounded discourse without visiting any material 
consequences upon the actual decision-making.   
Tracking the ongoing interaction between doctrine and factual and political context therefore 
requires also a broader aggregative perspective. Thus, our approach is outcome-based. It is 
decidedly more quantitative in orientation and requires an analysis of patterns in the decisions 
over time. Its advantage is enhanced objectivity. Decisions and remedies have a more 
concrete character that cannot be obscured by written reasoning or oral speech.  
 
 
                                                   
90 J. Viñuales, ‘Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: The Current State of Play’ in K. 
Miles (ed) Research Handbook on Environment and Investment Law (2016 forthcoming). 
91 C. Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the 
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration’ 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law (2012) 223. 
92 R. Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours’ 12 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 
(2014) 7.  
93 S. Alexandrov, ‘The Evolution of the Full Protection and Security Standard’ in M. Kinnear et al (eds) Building 
International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID (2015) 319. 
94  J. Maupin, ‘MFN-Based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any Hope for a Consistent 
Approach’ 14(1) Journal of International Economic Law (2011) 157. 
95 Van Harten (n 10) 251. 
96 See eg Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003) para 122. 
97 J. Waincymer, ‘Balancing Property Rights and Human Rights in Expropriation’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al 
(eds) Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (2009) 275; Henckels (n 91) 237. 
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A  Raw Data 
Using a range of output variables, we firstly ask whether there is change in outcomes across 
different periods of time. The measured outcomes are win/loss ratios, including for finally 
resolved cases, jurisdiction decisions, and liability/merits decisions, together with 
compensation ratios.  
The data is obtained from a new and first-of-its-kind database (PITAD) that codes all 
investment treaty arbitration proceedings since their inception. We include only cases whose 
legal claim is treaty-based. Claims based exclusively on a contract or a host state’s foreign 
investment law are excluded. Discontinued or settled cases are also omitted. With these 
conditions in place, and as at 1 August 2016, the dataset includes as at 343 finally resolved 
cases 98  and 651 discrete decisions (made up of 395 jurisdiction decisions 99  and 256 
liability/merits decisions).100 Both types of cases are useful in analyzing reflexivity. Finally 
resolved cases may capture diachronic strategic planning across a case (eg allowing a 
claimant-investor to win at the jurisdiction stage but not the liability/merits stage); and 
discrete decisions may better capture synchronic signals from actors at a point in time.  
One issue in coding for outcomes in investment treaty arbitration relates to how and to what 
degree a claimant-investor can be said to win at the jurisdiction or liability/merits stage of the 
dispute. Our database makes a distinction between full wins and partial wins. This results in 
two different indictors. The first is Any Win (at least a partial win) and the second is Full Win 
(only full wins counted).101 In this article, we conduct analysis for both outcome indicators 
although results for the latter (Full Wins) are only reported in full online.102 The Any Win 
indicator is the most empirically reliable measure: distinguishing partial wins from full wins is 
not an exact science.103 It is  also a strong analytical measure: failing to award anything to a 
claimant-investor represents a strong signal to both stakeholders and states about the posture 
of an arbitral tribunal. Nonetheless, the complementary use of the Full Win indicator may help 
us discern reflexivity. A move towards partial wins – so-called ’splitting the baby’ – may 
demonstrate a greater even-handedness by arbitrators. 
                                                   
98 Finally resolved cases are where the claimant-investor wins on the merits, or loses on jurisdiction or the 
merits.  
99 The jurisdiction decisions include bifurcated and non-bifurcated cases. For a non-bifurcated case, a decision 
where the claimant-investor ultimately loses on the merits will be coded as two decisions: one jurisdiction 
decision counted as a win for the claimant-investor and one merits decisions counted as a loss. 
100 These liability/merits decisions do not count quantum awards. In other words, a liability award in favor of a 
claimant-investor is counted in the same way as a merits award where damages are included.  
101 For Any Win (full and partials wins are coded as (1) and losses as (0)); and for a Full Win (full win coded as 
(1) and partial wins and losses as (0)). 
102  See <www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/topics/investment/research-projects/database.html> accessed 5 
September 2016. 
103 At the liability/merits stage, a full and partial win are not categorized according to the ratio of amount claimed 
and awarded or the number of successful claims. Rather, the distinction between full win and partial win is based 
on whether the claimant-investor – in a holistic assessment of the case – was made whole by the arbitral tribunal. 
At the jurisdiction stage, a full win is scored when no jurisdictional objections are sustained, and a partial win is 
scored where the jurisdiction of the tribunal is restricted in scope.  
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Figure 1 below shows the Any Win success ratios across time for the claimant-investor at the 
jurisdiction stage and the liability/merits stage of the dispute. It also tracks the Any Win 
success ratios for finally resolved cases. Eye-balling the trends, it is relatively clear that 
claimant-investors did well in the first decade of litigation. In the period 1990 to 2000, they 
rarely lost at the jurisdiction stage (94% success rate in 32 decisions) and they won in 
approximately 75% of finally resolved cases (23 cases) and liability/merits decisions (30 
decisions). From 2002, an observable drop in claimant-investor success occurs in finally 
resolved cases and liability/merits decisions. The trend downwards appears to begin in 2002 
and bottoms out a few years later. For the period 2002 through 2016, success rates in finally 
resolved cased drops to 44% for claimant-investors. For liability/merits decisions, the trends 
are slightly different. The success rates drops to 60% for the this period (2002 through 2016) 
overall, but there is a drift upwards in claimant-investor liability/merits decision successes 
from 2012 onwards.  
Figure 1: Claimant-Investor Success Ratios (by year) 
 
Jurisdictional decisions reveal a partially inverse pattern. There is a shift downwards to an 
average of 80% success in the period 2002 to 2010, but a further drop downwards to about 
70% from 2011 onwards. These divergent patterns in recent years help explain why the 
success ratio for claimant-investors in finally resolved cases remains fairly steady at about 
44% throughout the period of 2002 through 2016. In other words, claimant-investors are more 
likely to be stopped at the jurisdictional stage but, if they move through, they are more likely 
to succeed at the liability/merits stage. However, only so much can be read into this raw data 
as the outcomes are not controlled for structural features (an issue we address below).  
In addition, we created a compensation ratio in cases in which the claimant-investor won on 
the merits. The ratio is the amount awarded divided by the amount claimed. However, it could 
only be calculated for a subset of 135 cases, since information on both the amount of 
compensation claimed and awarded was not always known. The ratio has a large amount of 
annual variation but a surprising amount of overall stability. Between 1990 and 2004, the ratio 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Jursdictional Decisions (Any Win) Liability/Merits Decisions (Any Win)
Finally Resolved Cases (Any Win) Compensation Ratios
 
 
 
18 
 
was 43%; fell to 33% for the period 2005 through 2010; and rose to 38% between 2011 and 
2016. The overall rate across all periods is 37%. 
Figure 2: Splitting the Baby? – Full Win to Any Win Ratio in Finally Resolved Cases 
 
The above figures only relate to Any Wins. Yet, as noted earlier, strategic arbitrator behavior 
may involve switching from full wins to partial wins. Figure 2 above shows the ratio of the 
Full Win indicator to the total number of cases where the claimant-investor was successful at 
least partially. As is apparent from the 4-year moving average (dotted line in Figure 2), there 
is a decline in the ratio in the early 2000s (after a period in which claimant-investors were 
almost always completely successful) with a slight drift upwards since 2012. On its face, the 
data is suggestive of a shift towards splitting the baby. 
B  General Hypotheses 
Operationalization 
We now turn to ask whether these downward shifts in outcomes in investment treaty 
arbitrations (for finally resolved cases, jurisdiction decisions, liability/merits decisions) can be 
explained by arbitrator reflexivity. In seeking to test the institutionalist expectations, we have 
operationalized the two general hypotheses into three different models. Each model tests the 
effects of a mood indicator with a lag of one year.  
First, the State Signals hypothesis is captured by two separate indicators we have constructed 
to measure state mood in relation to the international investment regime. The State Mood I 
indicator for treaty exits records a unilateral withdrawal by one state party to an IIA, including 
the ICSID Convention. As Figure 3 below shows, this phenomenon begins in 2007, peaks in 
2008 (with 19 treaty exits) and has remained at a steady annual average of about six treaty 
exits. An alternative version of this indicator weights the three ICSID Convention withdrawals 
by Latin American states (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) by a factor of ten. This is 
because they received tremendous media and academic coverage, making their signaling 
power much stronger than a mere IIA withdrawal. 
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Figure 3: State Mood I – Number of Unilateral Treaty  Exits (by year) 
 
The treaty exits indicator is complemented by the State Mood  II, which records the number of 
new treaties (IIAs) signed by year. Importantly, this indicator is weighted for remaining 
available treaties that could be signed. However, the effects of this weighting are not hugely 
significant as the number of possible IIAs that could be signed is still massive.104 As Figure 4 
below shows, the number trends steadily downwards throughout the 2000s.  
Figure 4: State Mood II – Number of New Treaties Signed (by year) 
 
Second, the Stakeholder Signals hypothesis is tested with a general Stakeholder Mood 
indicator that measures the annual number of references to the legitimacy crisis in investment 
treaty arbitration in the scholarship. It records a Google Scholar search of the legitimacy crisis 
discourse in academic publications.105 As Figure 5 below shows, this discourse commenced in 
2004, spiked in 2009 and 2010, and has continued steadily upwards ever since.  
 
 
 
                                                   
104 There are currently 3329 IIAs (mostly bilateral) that have been signed globally (through 1 August 2016). 
However, to receive the same coverage as the WTO agreements, for example, states would need to sign the 
equivalent of 13041 BITs. 
105 Entering We began by entering the Boolean search terms of ‘legitimacy crisis,’ ‘investment treaty,’ and 
‘arbitration’ in with a custom range for each year, we identified. The 704 publications that appeared in the search 
were studied and further publications identified. 
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Figure 5: Stakeholder Mood – Legitimacy Crisis Scholarship (by year) 
 
In order to avoid potentially misleading bivariate results for the correlation between these 
three indicators and investment treaty arbitration outcomes, we include a set of controls for 
each model. The basic attributes are summarized in Table 1 below alongside the independent 
variables. First, we include a dummy variable for treaty-based arbitration type, specifically 
NAFTA-based Cases and ICSID-administered Cases. 106  Second, we apply an Extractive 
Industry Cases dummy measuring whether the investment leading to a claim is in the 
extractive industries economic sector. These cases often involve varying degrees of 
nationalization with the dispute centering on levels of compensation not liability (and thus 
claimant-investors will be more likely to win). Third, we add a measure of Law Firm 
Advantage to control for the effect of the quality (or at least the expense) of legal counsel as 
measured by whether claimant-investors and respondent states retained counsel from a Global 
100 law firm.107 Fourth, we include a dummy variable for State Learning to control for the 
effect of previous exposure to investment treaty arbitration.108 Fifth, to control for situations 
where specific events or circumstances create an artificially large caseload against a 
respondent state in a short space of time, we use a Case Cluster dummy.109 Sixth, we include 
a GDP Per Capita (Logged) for respondent states as a control, particularly since states with 
lower GDP per capita are more likely to lose.110 Finally, we have included a cubic year trend 
variable in all models. 
                                                   
106  We include this dummy because NAFTA-based arbitrations matured earlier, while ICSID-administered 
arbitrations are based on a specific treaty (the ICSID Convention) with some specific structural features. ICSID-
administered cases constitute 61% of all known treaty-based arbitrations registered through 1 August 2016. 
107 See American Lawyer <http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202471809600/2015-Global-100-TopGrossing-
Law-Firms-in-the-World> accessed 5 September 2016. The dummy takes the value of (1) if only the claimant-
investor counsel is from a Global 100 law firm; (-1) if only the respondent state retains a Global 100 law firm; or 
(0) if both the claimant-investor and the respondent state both have the same type of law firm representing them. 
108 We assume the marginal effect of state learning to diminish over time, and code how many cases any given 
respondent state has had filed against it at the time of case registration up until the tenth case. 
109 This measure takes the value (1) if a respondent state has had five or more cases registered against it in a 
given year, and (0) otherwise. The case clusters in the full set of cases registered are: Argentina (2002, 2003, 
2004), Czech Republic (2005), Ukraine (2008), Egypt (2011), and Venezuela (2011, 2012). 
110 Behn, Berge, and Langford (n 87).   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Fully Resolved Cases 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Outcome Variables      
Any Win 0.47 0.50 0 1 343 
Full Win 0.23 0.42 0 1 343 
Independent Variables      
State Mood I (Treaty Exits) 13.15 6.32 2 26 343 
State Mood (New Treaties) 80.65 43.77 33 198 343 
Stakeholder Mood 59.42 38.98 0 128 343 
Public Interest Case (Section 5C) 0.35 0.48 0 1 343 
Prominent Arbitrator (Section 5C) 0.59 0.49 0 1 334 
Controls      
NAFTA-based Case 0.10 0.30 0 1 343 
ICSID-administered Case 0.63 0.48 0 1 343 
Extractive Industry Case 0.17 0.38 0 1 343 
Law Firm Advantage -0.01 0.60 -1 1 343 
State Learning 5.30 3.55 1 10 343 
Case Cluster 0.11 0.32 0 1 343 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) 8.34 1.17 5.00 10.70 341 
Before turning to the results, it is important to note the limits of the explanatory model. Our 
approach is ‘X’ focused: we are testing whether specific mood variables could explain 
variation in outcomes in investment treaty arbitration, subject to a set of controls. We are not 
conducting a larger ‘Y’ based model that seeks to capture all reasons for claimant-investor 
success rates. This potentially limits the casual findings in two ways.  
The first is that it is important to distinguish between arbitrator and systemic reflexivity. As 
principals, states may adopt strategies that directly affect the underlying legal framework (ie 
the IIAs themselves) in which investment treaty arbitrators operate. While we are developing 
measurements to capture this variable, we doubt however that the legal framework governing 
foreign investment has shifted by such a degree to solely explain the variance in arbitration 
outcomes. This is principally because almost all of the decisions under analysis in this article 
are based on IIAs that were drafted before the emergence of the legitimacy crisis. Moreover, 
even where there is an arbitration based on a newer generation treaty, we have found that 
expected outcomes are not always generated.111 
The second danger is that the relationship between claimant-investor success and future 
litigation may be partly endogenous. The growing awareness of the open legal opportunity 
structure112 of investment treaty arbitration may have prompted foreign investors to bring 
more dubious cases. If so, a possible consequence is a rise in the number of cases being lost; 
yet, this shift in outcomes does not signal arbitrator reflexivity to the legitimacy crisis. We 
                                                   
111 For instance, where the respondent state has defended a challenged measure on environment-related grounds, 
and the dispute is based on a newer generation of IIAs mentioning environmental protection (eg DR-CAFTA and 
newer US bilateral FTAs (BFTAs)), outcomes do not appear strongly related to these provisions. In the seven 
such cases, the claimant-investors lost each time but almost always at the more technical jurisdictional stage (six 
of seven cases). See D. Behn and M. Langford, ‘Trumping the Environment? An Empirical Perspective on 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 18(1) The Journal of World Investment and Trade (forthcoming 2017). 
112 C. Hilson, ‘New Social Movements: The Role of Legal Opportunity’ 9 Journal of European Public Policy 
(2002) 238.  
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have only begun to develop a legal strength indicator for each case yet we are uncertain as to 
whether there has been a recent uptick in dubious cases, at least at the liability/merits stage. 
The likelihood of claimant-investor success dropped quite early – well before the possibility 
of a wave of dubious cases entering the system – and has remained quite steady across time 
until very recently. In the case of jurisdiction decisions, this endogeneity argument may have 
more explanatory power. Here, there has certainly been a recent decrease in claimant-investor 
success rate; although, even here this might be explained by reflexivity – with arbitrators 
tightening jurisdictional criteria as a response to the legitimacy crisis. In any case, trying to 
separate out these effects is a clear task for a future research agenda on investment treaty 
arbitrator behavior.  
Results 
Table 2 below sets out the logit regression results. The controls in Model 1 are largely as 
expected. Law Firm Advantage and Extractive Industry Case controls are positively 
correlated with claimant-investor success while respondent state development status (as 
measured by GDP Per Capita (Logged)) is negatively correlated. The remaining control 
variables are not statistically significant and surprisingly respondent states do not gain an 
advantage from facing repeat litigation (the State Learning control). However, the NAFTA-
based Case control is significant in the full Model 4 and the control variables otherwise carry 
the expected sign.  
However, the Stakeholder Mood indicator is not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
coefficient is surprisingly positive. Testing with alternative outcome indicators (Full Wins, 
jurisdiction decisions, liability/merits decisions), we only find a significant and negative 
relationship at the jurisdictional stage.113 This may reflect the recent decline in jurisdictional 
successes for claimant-investors and the ongoing rise in the amount of legitimacy crisis 
scholarship annually. However, while there is some doctrinal evidence that investment treaty 
arbitrators may be increasingly restricting interpretations of jurisdictional criteria in 
investment treaty arbitration (suggesting reflexivity), we are somewhat reluctant to suggest 
that the recent drop in jurisdictional success rates for claimant-investors can be fully 
explained by reflexive arbitral behavior. This is particularly so when there has been an 
upwards drift in claimant-investor success at the liability/merits stage of the dispute 
(especially in the period of 2012 to 2014).  
Turning to the State Mood I indicator, the coefficient is as expected, namely negative. An 
increase in unilateral IIA exits corresponds with a decrease in claimant-investor success. 
While this indicator is not significant in Model 1, it is so in the full Model 4, and also for the 
subset of liability/merits decisions.114 The State Mood II indicator is positive as expected and 
significant in Model 2. A rise in the number of IIAs signed correlates with investor success. 
However, the indicator is just outside the zone of significance in the full Model 4.  
 
                                                   
113 Ibid. 
114 See extra Tables at <www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/topics/investment/research-projects/database.html> 
accessed 5 September 2016. 
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Table 2: Logit Regression Results for State and Stakeholder Mood (Any Win) 
  Controls Treaty Exits 
New 
Treaties Stakeholder All 
  Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Variables 
State Mood I (Treaty Exits) 
  
 
 
-0.03     
 
-0.04* 
State Mood II (New Treaties)     0.01**    0.01 
Stakeholder Mood        0.01  0.01 
Controls           
NAFTA-based Case -0.64 -0.70 -0.73 -0.64 -1.70** 
ICSID-administered Case -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 -0.04 
Extractive Industry Case  0.68**  0.70**  0.67**  0.69**  0.32 
Law Firm Advantage  0.47**  0.45**  0.46**  0.48**  0.21 
State Learning  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.11** 
Case Cluster  0.57  0.53  0.57  0.55 -0.01 
GDP Per Capita (Logged) -0.35** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.30** 
Cubic Year Trend -0.00003 -0.00003 0.00006 -0.0001 -0.00005 
Chi2 36.99 39.16 41.11 37.33 24.10 
Observations (Number of Cases ) 341 341 341 341 341  
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Returning to the two State Mood indicators, we now look at the magnitude of the measured 
shift. This can be graphically observed in Figure 6 below which shows the predicted 
probabilities for 5-unit differences in the treaty exits (State Mood I) indicator. Holding all 
other control and mood variables constant at their means, the probability of a claimant-
investor win is 56% when the treaty exit indicator is at zero, yet falls to 38% when the number 
of annual IIA exits rises to 25 (which occurred in 2009).  
Figure 6: Predicted Outcomes for State Mood I (Treaty Exits) 
 
In the case of the new treaties (State Mood II) indictor, the differences across the indicators’ 
range are even more dramatic. Holding all other control and mood variables constant, 
claimant-investors achieved 80% success rates in years where there were close to 200 IIAs 
that were signed annually. But this drops to 30% in years where the number of annual IIAs 
signed bottoms out at 30 per year (see Figure 7 below). However, it is important to note that 
the confidence intervals at the ends of ranges for both State Mood indicators are large and, in 
the case of the treaty exits indicator, partially overlap. Thus, many claimant-investors are still 
able to achieve reasonable levels of success in these years but the proportion of such 
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successes is significantly lower. Nonetheless, the results indicate that the correlation between 
these two State Mood indicators and outcomes in fully resolved investment treaty arbitrations 
is significant. 
Figure 7: Predicted Outcomes for State Mood II (New Treaties) 
 
C  Specific Hypotheses 
We now turn to examine the four specific hypotheses that might shed further light on whether 
strategic arbitrator behavior is occurring.  
Influential State Signals 
The Influential State hypothesis is measured (somewhat crudely) by breaking up outcomes 
according to five three-yearly crisis periods that follow 2001 and correspond to our analysis in 
Section 2. This disaggregation allows us to examine possible structural breaks after 
interventions by a small number of large influential states (primarily the US but also the EU) 
that we believe may have disproportionate signaling power. The first structural breaks relating 
to influential states are the pro-state signals sent by the NAFTA state parties after the issuance 
of the FTC Interpretive Note in 2001 and the release of the new US model BIT in 2004; and 
the pro-investor signals sent by the ramping up of negotiations115 by the US, EU, and China 
for large-scale bilateral and plurilateral trade and investment treaties (that include ISDS), 
particularly after February 2013.  
Controlling for the same factors as above, Figure 8 below shows the predicted probabilities in 
each period for claimant-investor success. It is notable that the probability of success does fall 
after the first break (after 2001) and the second break (after 2004) but the decrease in 
claimant-investor success is only statistically significant after the second break.116 Turning to 
the last structural break (after 2013), the average success rate for claimant-investors is 
comparable to all the preceding periods. However, it is notably that claimant-investor success 
rates are not different (no statistical significance) from the period 1990 to 2001. While the p-
                                                   
115 A number of these large bilateral and plurilateral negotiations were officially launched prior to 2012, but we 
use 2012 as the year when these negotiations ramped up significantly.  
116 See (n 114). 
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scores hover close to the 10% level, the large confidence interval for 2014 to 2016 reveals the 
fact that a large number of claimant-investors are enjoying success that is almost comparable 
to the period 1990 to 2001. Caution should be exercised in reading too much into this crude 
measure but the pattern of structural changes suggests that influential states may be exercising 
a renewed subtle influence on investment treaty arbitrators; a factor paradoxically enhanced 
by the results for the Development Status Asymmetries below.  
Figure 8: Influential State Signals and Structural Breaks 
 
Public Interest Cases 
For the Public Interest Cases hypothesis, it was hypothesized that investment treaty 
arbitrators may display greater state deferentialism in cases raising public interest concerns. 
These are cases that have gained notoriety during process of being litigated because they 
involve very large compensation claims, challenges to human rights-related or environment-
related measures, or challenges to legislative rather than administrative (executive branch) 
action. Extreme examples would include, inter alia: the Phillip Morris,117 Vattenfall,118 and 
Yukos shareholder cases.119 Less extreme examples include, inter alia, cases discussed largely 
on points of law such as the Salini case,120 the Argentinian bondholder cases,121 and some of 
the early NAFTA-based arbitrations like Metalclad122 and Methanex.123 We have thus created 
a binary Public Interest Case indicator for all investment treaty arbitrations that fall into these 
categories and in which we would expect arbitrators to be aware of the public interest 
dimension involved in these cases: 69 of the 343 finally resolved cases in our dataset meet 
this criteria.  
                                                   
117 See (n 39, 40). 
118 See (n 41). 
119 See (n 49). 
120 Salini Costruttori and Italstrade v Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 July 
2001).  
121 See Abaclat and Others v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Settled; Ambiente Ufficio and Others v 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Discontinued; Alemanni and Others v Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/8, Discontinued. 
122 Metalclad v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000). 
123 Methanex v United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (19 August 2005). 
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Turning to measurement, we created an interaction term between Public Interest Cases and 
the different crisis periods. This enables us to measure both the general trend in these cases 
and whether arbitrator reflexivity is comparably grater than in all other investment treaty 
arbitrations. Figure 9 below sets out the results.124 As is clear, claimant-investors consistently 
do better in Public Interest Cases as we have defined them. This is largely because such cases 
disproportionately occur in the extractive industry economic sector where claimant-investor 
success rates are consistently high. Turning to reflexivity, the rate of claimant-investor 
success in Public Interest Cases has fallen in parallel with the general decline in claimant-
investor success. This is notable given that we might suppose that claimant-investors will 
generally have consistently good chances in the subset of extractive industry cases. However, 
it is nonetheless difficult to discern any significant change between Public Interest Cases and 
all other cases over time. Only in the periods of 2005 through 2007 and 2014 through 2016 do 
we notice a contraction in the difference between these two categories. But this difference is 
not statistically significant.  
Figure 9: Public Interest Cases Across Crisis Periods 
 
Development Status Asymmetries 
For this hypothesis, we predicted that investment treaty arbitrators might be more deferential 
to less developed states after the emergence of concerns about an alleged anti-developing state 
bias. We measured this by breaking up the sample into the five three-yearly crisis periods and 
examining the claimant-investor success rates for various levels of development. The results 
were the opposite of what might be expected. As Figure 10 below demonstrates, states with 
higher levels of development enjoyed most of the decline of claimant-investor success over 
time. Thus states at the high end of the scale (GDP Per Capita (Logged) between 9 and 11) 
had seen claimant-investor success rates drop from 90% to around 15 to 20% over the last two 
decades but the poorest states (between 5 and 7) were facing claimant-investor success rates 
of 40 to 60%. This suggests that some states matter more than others and lends some further 
and indirect support to the Influential State hypothesis. 
                                                   
124 See (n 114). 
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Figure 10: Development Status Across Crisis Periods 
 
Prominent Arbitrators 
Finally, with regard to the Prominent Arbitrator hypothesis, we code for the presence of a 
tribunal president who has rendered five or more decisions (as a tribunal president). Using an 
interaction term, we test whether the presence of a prominent tribunal president decreased the 
chances of claimant-investor success in the different periods after 2001 relative to other cases. 
As Figure 11 shows, investment treaty arbitrations with a prominent tribunal president were 
slightly more likely to award claimant-investors any success from 2005 onwards – the reverse 
of what was expected. However, the differences are not statistically significant suggesting that 
prominent tribunal presidents are not acting in any importantly different way than other 
tribunal members. 
Figure 11: Prominent Arbitrators Across Crisis Periods 
 
5 Conclusion 
Since the mid-2000s, the international investment regime has been subject to a ‘legitimacy 
crisis.’ While the regime has its ardent supporters, the mood of various stakeholders from a 
diverse group of states, scholars, and global social movements has tilted towards viewing the 
regime as pro-investor, pro-Western, and jurisprudentially incoherent. We have not tried to 
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solve this normative debate in this article but instead focused on its effects. We have asked 
whether investment treaty arbitrators are reflexively evolving and helping the system adapt to 
more legitimate and effective forms of international adjudication (by becoming more 
deferential to respondent states in investment treaty arbitration).  
The article set out various rational choice and discursive-based reasons for thinking that 
investment treaty arbitrators would be sensitive and adaptive. We counter these reasons with a 
competing set of legalistic (and attitudinal) reasons that may inhibit investment treaty 
arbitrators from acting in such a fashion. Drawing upon a newly developed investment treaty 
arbitration database (PITAD), we demonstrated that there has been a significant drop in 
claimant-investor success across time and found some initial evidence that investment treaty 
arbitrators have shifted their behavior on some types of outcomes.  
Our main finding is that states matter. Indicators measuring general state mood (IIA exits and 
new IIAs signed) and the intervention of influential states were the most strongly correlated 
with the variations in claimant-investor success (or lack thereof); while our indicator for the 
general stakeholder mood tracked investment treaty arbitration outcomes poorly. Notably 
these results resonate with the general doctrinal developments in international investment law 
and cohere with research on domestic courts, where judges are found sensitive to influential 
state actors but less responsive to broad diffuse public opinion. 
However, the research represents only a first take on the question of reflexivity in  investment 
treaty arbitration. The field is ripe for further quantitative and qualitative research. We have 
only touched the surface and our findings remain tentative. There is room for improvement of 
the dependent and independent variables as well as the use of qualitative methods. A 
particular issue is why some of our specific hypotheses were not confirmed. Why were 
prominent arbitrators no more reflexive than their counterparts? Why was there not a greater 
drop in claimant-investor success rates in public interest cases than in all other cases? Is it 
because the reflexivity effect is not so strong? Or is it because reflexive arbitral behavior is 
fragmented throughout the international investment regime, such that only some arbitrators 
act in a strategic manner? This latter speculation would certainly cohere with the patchwork 
nature of doctrinal development, but remains a question to be investigated. 
Returning to the normative debates with which we began, our research presents a divergent 
contribution. On one hand, we have shown that the system has adjusted considerably since its 
infancy. Claimant-investor success rates have fallen dramatically and hover around 40% 
today. This is certainly much lower than the comparable figure of 90%-plus for applicant 
states in WTO litigation. On the other hand, we have found a clear asymmetry in the 
distribution of the reflexive gains for states. It is developed states that are the beneficiaries of 
the large drop in claimant-investor success rates; less developed states have only registered 
marginal benefits. Moreover, if we compare claimant-investor success rates in the 
international human rights regime with those of investment arbitration, the latter appears 
rather high. The result is a mixed picture. The investment treaty arbitration system has been 
able to enhance effectively its respect for state sovereignty (and partly regulatory autonomy) 
but some states are more equal than others. 
